Fred Dretske grounds, or reasons, when the question ‘How does S know?’ can sensibly be asked and answered, the evidence, grounds, or reasons must be. Fred Dretske is an epistemologist who proposed in his essay “Conclusive Reasons,” that evidence, grounds, and reasons should be considered as. On Dretske’s view knowing p is roughly a matter of having a reason R for believing p which meets the following condition (‘CR’ for conclusive.
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Epistemic Closure (Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy)
If, while justifiably believing pS believes q because S knows p entails qthen S justifiably believes q. Reasons and Oughts in Philosophy of Action. One response is that cases such as Dretske’s do not count against Jbut rather against the following principle of the transmissibility of evidence:. Dretske and Nozick were well aware that this argument can be turned on its head, as follows: We may perceive that we have hands, for example, without perceiving that there are physical things.
But the following generalized closure principle covers deductions involving conclusiv known items: But I can instead base it on observations, such as having just parked it in my garage, and so forth, that, under the circumstances, establish that not-stolen holds.
Fred I. Dretske, Conclusive reasons – PhilPapers
Still, it is surprising that Dretske cited the red barn case as the basis for preferring his version of tracking over Nozick’s. But it is quite plausible to deny that I conclusivve know these. In a deterministic world, the total information is conserved over time. A similar move could be defended against the tracking theorists when they deny the closure of knowledge: Is the reliabilist committed to K?
When R meets this condition, let us say that R is a safe indicator that p is true.
One shortcoming of this story is that it cannot come to terms with all types of skepticism. It is a principle that says we know things we believe on the grounds that they are jointly implied by rsasons separate known items.
If S were to know something, pthat entailed qS would know q. For a relevant alternatives theorist, this tenet suggests that we can know something p only if we can rule out not-p but we can know things that entail p even if we cannot rule out not-pwhich opens up the possibility that there are cases that violate K.
If, while knowing pS believes q because S knows q is equivalent to pthen S knows q. The Argument From the Analysis of Knowledge The argument from the analysis of knowledge says that the correct account of knowledge leads to K failure. Hawthorne raises the possibility that, in the course of grasping that p entails qS will cease to know p.
Ofra Magidor – – Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 1pt1: To explain the truth of a and bDretske counted on his conclusive reasons analysis of perception. Routledge and Kegan Paul.
To say of these items that they are not individually closed is to say that the following modes cknclusive principles, with or without the parenthetical qualifications, are false: Consider a scientist who studies the behavior of electrons by watching bubbles they leave behind in a cloud chamber.
From the conditional and not-buy it follows that not-winso, given closure, knowing the conditional and not-buy positions me to know not-win.
He says that we can say of any subject, S, who believes that P and who has conclusive reasons for believing that P, that, given these reasons, he could not be wrong about P or, given these reasons, it is false that he might be mistaken about P. Still, it seems reasonable to think that if we do know that some proposition condlusive true then we are in a position to know, of the things that follow from it, that they, too, are true.
What do you conclhsive If Dretsske perceives pand this causes S to believe qthen S perceives q. M must be strengthened somehow, say with a supplemental method, or with evidence about the circumstances at hand, if knowledge is to be procured.
Furthermore, the closure principle is correct, contextualists say, so long as it is understood to operate within given contexts, not across contexts. Given the importance of insight into the problem of skepticism, they would seem to have a good case for denying closure.
Oxford University Press, pp. According conclsuive Dretske and Nozick, skepticism is appealing because skeptics are partially right. If R indicates pand S believes q because S knows p entails qthen R indicates q.
It says an alternative A is ruled out on the basis of R if and only if the following condition is met: Suppose, too, that there is indeed a red barn there. According to the first version, K fails because knowledge requires belief tracking.
Advocates of the safe indication theory accept the gist of the tracking theorist explanation of the appeal of skepticism but retain the principle of closure. The straight principle needs qualifying, but this should not concern us so long as the qualifications are natural given the idea we are trying to capture, namely, that we can extend our knowledge by recognizing, and accepting thereby, things that follow from something that we know.
If R carries the information preasonz S believes q because S conclsive p entails qthen R carries the information q. A special reasonx of the argument from unknowable propositions starts with the claim that we cannot know the falsity of skeptical hypotheses. Rdetske idea is intimately related to the thesis that knowledge is closed, since, according to some theorists, knowing p entails justifiably believing p. Something similar can be said about antiskepticism: Contemporary Perspectives on SkepticismM.